| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7874 |
| DP7874 Caps in Sequential Contests | |
| Aner Sela; Reut Megidish | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | All-pay auctions Bid caps Multi-stage contests |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7874 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536711 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela,Reut Megidish. DP7874 Caps in Sequential Contests. 2010. |
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