G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7874
DP7874 Caps in Sequential Contests
Aner Sela; Reut Megidish
发表日期2010-06-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词All-pay auctions Bid caps Multi-stage contests
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7874
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536711
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Aner Sela,Reut Megidish. DP7874 Caps in Sequential Contests. 2010.
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