G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7900
DP7900 Screening with an Approximate Type Space
Andrea Prat; Kristóf Madarász
发表日期2010-06-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We re-visit the single-agent mechanism design problem with quasilinear preferences, but we assume that the principal knowingly operates on the basis of only an approximate type space rather than the (potentially complex) truth. We propose a two-step scheme, the profit-participation mechanism, whereby: (i) the principal `takes the model seriously' and computes the optimal menu for the approximate type space; (ii) but she discounts the price of each allocation proportionally to the profit that the allocation would yield in the approximate model. We characterize the bound to the profit loss and show that it vanishes smoothly as the distance between the approximate type space and the true type space converges to zero. Instead, we show that it is not a valid approximation to simply act as if the model was correct.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Computational complexity Mechanism design Model uncertainty Nonlinear pricing Screening
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7900
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536736
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Andrea Prat,Kristóf Madarász. DP7900 Screening with an Approximate Type Space. 2010.
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