G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7914
DP7914 Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
Gerd Muehlheusser; Andreas Roider; Florian Englmaier
发表日期2010-07-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal contracts may entail properties such as inducing first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness with respect to changes in verifiable parameters. Moreover, while always socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium. Except for the latter, these findings are robust to renegotiation. When the outside option is exogenous instead, the standard results obtain.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Ex-post outside option Limited commitment Limited liability Moral hazard
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7914
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536751
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Gerd Muehlheusser,Andreas Roider,Florian Englmaier. DP7914 Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave. 2010.
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