| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7914 |
| DP7914 Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave | |
| Gerd Muehlheusser; Andreas Roider; Florian Englmaier | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal contracts may entail properties such as inducing first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness with respect to changes in verifiable parameters. Moreover, while always socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium. Except for the latter, these findings are robust to renegotiation. When the outside option is exogenous instead, the standard results obtain. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Ex-post outside option Limited commitment Limited liability Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7914 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536751 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerd Muehlheusser,Andreas Roider,Florian Englmaier. DP7914 Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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