G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7915
DP7915 Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship banking and conditionality lending in the London market for government debt, 1815-1913
Marc Flandreau; Juan Flores
发表日期2010-07-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending in 19th-century international capital markets. We argue that ownership of reputation signals by prestigious banks rendered them able and willing to monitor government borrowing. Monitoring was a source of rent, and it led bankers to support countries facing liquidity crises in a manner similar to modern descriptions of ?relationship? lending to corporate clients by ?parent? banks. Prestigious bankers? ability to implement conditionality loans and monitor countries? financial policies also enabled them to deal with solvency. We find that, compared with prestigious bankers, bondholders? committees had neither the tools nor the prestige required for effectively dealing with defaulters. Hence such committees were far less important than previous research has claimed.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Bondholder committees Conditionality Debt crises Prestige Relationship banking
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7915
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536752
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marc Flandreau,Juan Flores. DP7915 Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship banking and conditionality lending in the London market for government debt, 1815-1913. 2010.
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