| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7926 |
| DP7926 Protection for Free? The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions | |
| Rodney D Ludema; Anna Mayda; Prachi Mishra | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the political influence of individual firms on Congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on U.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a model in which firms influence the government by transmitting information about the value of protection, via costless messages (cheap-talk) and costly messages (lobbying). We estimate our model using firm-level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures from 1999-2006, and find that indeed verbal opposition by import-competing firms, with no lobbying, significantly reduces the probability of a suspension being granted. In addition, lobbying expenditures by proponent and opponent firms sway this probability in opposite directions. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Cheap talk Endogenous protection Tariff suspensions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7926 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536763 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rodney D Ludema,Anna Mayda,Prachi Mishra. DP7926 Protection for Free? The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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