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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP7955 |
DP7955 Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions | |
Nicola Gennaioli; Stefano Rossi; Alberto Martin | |
发表日期 | 2010-08-01 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We build a model where sovereign defaults weaken banks? balance sheets because banks hold sovereign bonds, causing private credit to decline. Stronger financial institutions boost default costs by amplifying these balance-sheet effects. This yields a novel complementarity between public debt and domestic credit markets, where the latter sustain the former by increasing the costs of default. We document three novel empirical facts that are consistent with our model's predictions: public defaults are followed by large private credit contractions; these contractions are stronger in countries where banks hold more public debt and financial institutions are stronger; in these same countries default is less likely. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Capital flows Financial liberalization Institutions Sovereign risk Sudden stops |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7955 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536790 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicola Gennaioli,Stefano Rossi,Alberto Martin. DP7955 Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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