G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7955
DP7955 Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions
Nicola Gennaioli; Stefano Rossi; Alberto Martin
发表日期2010-08-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We build a model where sovereign defaults weaken banks? balance sheets because banks hold sovereign bonds, causing private credit to decline. Stronger financial institutions boost default costs by amplifying these balance-sheet effects. This yields a novel complementarity between public debt and domestic credit markets, where the latter sustain the former by increasing the costs of default. We document three novel empirical facts that are consistent with our model's predictions: public defaults are followed by large private credit contractions; these contractions are stronger in countries where banks hold more public debt and financial institutions are stronger; in these same countries default is less likely.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Capital flows Financial liberalization Institutions Sovereign risk Sudden stops
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7955
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536790
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Nicola Gennaioli,Stefano Rossi,Alberto Martin. DP7955 Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions. 2010.
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