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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP7958 |
DP7958 Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals | |
Monika Schnitzer | |
发表日期 | 2010-08-01 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire building tendencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems. |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
关键词 | Capital structure Coinsurance Creditor rights Internal capital markets Multinational corporations |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7958 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536793 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Monika Schnitzer. DP7958 Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals. 2010. |
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