G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7958
DP7958 Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals
Monika Schnitzer
发表日期2010-08-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire building tendencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems.
主题Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词Capital structure Coinsurance Creditor rights Internal capital markets Multinational corporations
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7958
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536793
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Monika Schnitzer. DP7958 Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals. 2010.
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