G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7959
DP7959 Electoral Incentives and Economic Policy across Political Regimes
Vincenzo Galasso; Salvatore Nunnari
发表日期2010-08-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要This paper provides a direct test of the causal link from electoral rules to economic policy. Our theoretical model delivers unambigous predictions on the interaction between institutions and a time varying event, namely the unemployment rate in pivotal and non-pivotal districts. We use local level data on unemployment rate and political competition to obtain an empirical specification which matches our model. First, we test the effect of electoral incentives under majority rule, by analyzing the US House representatives voting records on the 2009 Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act, which increased unemployment benefit coverage and generosity. Second, we exploit the time-varying dimension of our theoretical prediction to test the causal effect on panel data. We use a dataset with local information on electoral competitiveness and unemployment rates for 29 OECD countries in 1980-2001 and employ panel analysis on different measures of UB generosity. The empirical evidence strongly supports our theoretical predictions.
主题Public Economics
关键词Economic policy Electoral rules Pivotal districts Unemployment benefits
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7959
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536794
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Vincenzo Galasso,Salvatore Nunnari. DP7959 Electoral Incentives and Economic Policy across Political Regimes. 2010.
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