| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7970 |
| DP7970 Pandering to Persuade | |
| Wouter Dessein; Yeon-Koo Che; Navin Kartik | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A principal chooses one of n>=2 projects or an outside option. An agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. We show that strategic communication is characterized by pandering: the agent biases his recommendation toward good-looking projects--those with appealing observable attributes--even when both parties would be better off with some other project. Projects become more acceptable when pitched against a stronger slate of alternatives. We study organizational responses to the pandering distortion, such as delegation and choosing to be less informed. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Decision processes Delegation Multi-dimensional cheap talk Pandering Persuasion Resource allocation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7970 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536807 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wouter Dessein,Yeon-Koo Che,Navin Kartik. DP7970 Pandering to Persuade. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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