G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7989
DP7989 Should Auctions Be Transparent?
Dirk Bergemann; Johannes Hörner
发表日期2010-09-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. Of particular interest is the minimal disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation of the winner's lower future bids. This equilibrium is efficient, and all information is eventually revealed. Importantly, this disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. We contrast the minimal disclosure setting with the case in which all bids are public, and the case in which only the winner's bids are public. In these settings, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues always exists with a sufficiently large number of bidders.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词First price auction Information revelation Private bids Repeated auctions
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7989
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536826
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dirk Bergemann,Johannes Hörner. DP7989 Should Auctions Be Transparent?. 2010.
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