全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP8003 Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP8003
	DP8003 Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments
	Erik Snowberg; Gerard Padró i Miquel; Sylvain Chassang
发表日期	2010-09-23
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	We study the design of randomized controlled experiments in environments where outcomes are significantly affected by unobserved effort decisions taken by the subjects (agents). While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort provision compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs--which we call selective trials--can help improve the external validity of experiments. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help experimenters identify when measured treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort provision.
主题	Development Economics
关键词	Blind trials Compliance Heterogeneous beliefs Incentivized trials Marginal treatment eects Mechanism design Randomized controlled trials Selection Selective trials
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp8003
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536840
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Erik Snowberg,Gerard Padró i Miquel,Sylvain Chassang. DP8003 Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments. 2010.