G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8003
DP8003 Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments
Erik Snowberg; Gerard Padró i Miquel; Sylvain Chassang
发表日期2010-09-23
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We study the design of randomized controlled experiments in environments where outcomes are significantly affected by unobserved effort decisions taken by the subjects (agents). While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort provision compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs--which we call selective trials--can help improve the external validity of experiments. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help experimenters identify when measured treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort provision.
主题Development Economics
关键词Blind trials Compliance Heterogeneous beliefs Incentivized trials Marginal treatment eects Mechanism design Randomized controlled trials Selection Selective trials
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8003
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536840
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Erik Snowberg,Gerard Padró i Miquel,Sylvain Chassang. DP8003 Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments. 2010.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Erik Snowberg]的文章
[Gerard Padró i Miquel]的文章
[Sylvain Chassang]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Erik Snowberg]的文章
[Gerard Padró i Miquel]的文章
[Sylvain Chassang]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Erik Snowberg]的文章
[Gerard Padró i Miquel]的文章
[Sylvain Chassang]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。