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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP8003 |
DP8003 Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments | |
Erik Snowberg; Gerard Padró i Miquel; Sylvain Chassang | |
发表日期 | 2010-09-23 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the design of randomized controlled experiments in environments where outcomes are significantly affected by unobserved effort decisions taken by the subjects (agents). While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort provision compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs--which we call selective trials--can help improve the external validity of experiments. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help experimenters identify when measured treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort provision. |
主题 | Development Economics |
关键词 | Blind trials Compliance Heterogeneous beliefs Incentivized trials Marginal treatment eects Mechanism design Randomized controlled trials Selection Selective trials |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8003 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536840 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Erik Snowberg,Gerard Padró i Miquel,Sylvain Chassang. DP8003 Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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