| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8016 |
| DP8016 Splitting Tournaments | |
| Hessel Oosterbeek; Bas van der Klaauw; Edwin Leuven | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we investigate how heterogeneous agents choose among tournaments with different prizes. We show that if the number of agents is sufficiently small, multiple equilibria can arise. Depending on how the prize money is split over the tournaments, these may include, for example, a perfect-sorting equilibrium in which high-ability agents compete in the high-prize tournament, while low-ability agents compete for the low prize. However, there are also equilibria in which agents follow a mixed strategy and there can be reverse sorting, i.e. low-ability agents are in the tournament with the high prize, while high-ability agents are in the low-prize tournament. We show that total effort always decreases compared to a single tournament. However, splitting the tournament may increase the effort of low-ability agents. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Heterogenous agents Self-selection Social planner Tournament |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8016 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536853 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hessel Oosterbeek,Bas van der Klaauw,Edwin Leuven. DP8016 Splitting Tournaments. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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