G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8016
DP8016 Splitting Tournaments
Hessel Oosterbeek; Bas van der Klaauw; Edwin Leuven
发表日期2010-09-23
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要In this paper we investigate how heterogeneous agents choose among tournaments with different prizes. We show that if the number of agents is sufficiently small, multiple equilibria can arise. Depending on how the prize money is split over the tournaments, these may include, for example, a perfect-sorting equilibrium in which high-ability agents compete in the high-prize tournament, while low-ability agents compete for the low prize. However, there are also equilibria in which agents follow a mixed strategy and there can be reverse sorting, i.e. low-ability agents are in the tournament with the high prize, while high-ability agents are in the low-prize tournament. We show that total effort always decreases compared to a single tournament. However, splitting the tournament may increase the effort of low-ability agents.
主题Labour Economics
关键词Heterogenous agents Self-selection Social planner Tournament
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8016
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536853
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Hessel Oosterbeek,Bas van der Klaauw,Edwin Leuven. DP8016 Splitting Tournaments. 2010.
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