| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8053 |
| DP8053 Contract Choice, Incentives, and Political Capture in the Public Sector | |
| Marc Ivaldi; Philippe Gagnepain | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory schemes are the observable items of a complex menu of contracts, as proposed by Laffont and Tirole. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by a regulatory framework where an unsophisticated regulator is politically motivated. We show how these political preferences shape the contract choice and we shed light on how operating costs are affected. On average, operators? costs are 12.1% lower under fixed-plus regimes, compared to the cost-plus cases. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contract choice Cost reduction Incentives Public transit |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8053 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536903 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marc Ivaldi,Philippe Gagnepain. DP8053 Contract Choice, Incentives, and Political Capture in the Public Sector. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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