G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8109
DP8109 Brothers in Alms? Coordination between NGOs on Markets for Development Donations
Thierry Verdier; Marco Marini; Gani Aldashev
发表日期2010-11-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the stability of coordination between mission-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) competing for donations. We build a non-cooperative game-theoretic model of alliance formation between NGOs that compete through fundraising activities and impose externalities on each others? output. We derive general results on the stability of full coordination under two classes of alliance-formation rules: unanimity and aggregative. If fundraising activities are strategic complements, the grandcoalition (i.e. full coordination) is always individually stable and, under the unanimity rule, coalitionally stable. When fundraising activities are strategic substitutes, the grandcoalition can be unstable and the instability is more likely, the steeper are NGOs? (negatively sloped) best-reply functions. Under the aggregative rule, the grandcoalition is stable: (i) individually, if there are negative coalitional externalities; (ii) coalitionally, if breaking an alliance requires the majority of NGOs involved in the alliance.
主题Development Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Ngos Giving Coordination Endogenous coalition formation Non-distribution constraint
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8109
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536931
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Thierry Verdier,Marco Marini,Gani Aldashev. DP8109 Brothers in Alms? Coordination between NGOs on Markets for Development Donations. 2010.
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