| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP8111
|
| DP8111 Infection, Acquired Immunity and Externalities in Treatment |
| Flavio Toxvaerd
|
| 发表日期 | 2010-11-01
|
| 出版年 | 2010
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper considers a model of infectious disease, such as swine flu, in which privately costly treatment confers immunity on recovered individuals. It is shown that under decentralized decision making, infected individuals ignore the externality that their treatment has on susceptible individuals and thus seek treatment only if it is privately optimal to do so. In contrast, a benevolent central planner who does take this externality into account in choosing the level of aggregate treatment, may choose to either eradicate the disease or to retard its eventual dissemination into the population even when individuals would not find it privately optimal to do so. The analysis shows that when immunity from future infection is obtained through recovery, treatment resembles vaccination in its effects on infection dynamics, but important differences remain. Vaccination is shown to more effectively curb infection than does treatment. Last, the inefficiency associated with decentralized decision making can be corrected through subsidized treatment offered on a first-come first-served basis. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Acquired immunity
Economic epidemiology
Externalities
Treatment
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8111
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536933
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Flavio Toxvaerd. DP8111 Infection, Acquired Immunity and Externalities in Treatment. 2010.
|
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