G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8097
DP8097 Who Invests in Home Equity to Exempt Wealth from Bankruptcy?
Harry Huizinga; Reint Gropp; Luc Laeven; Stefano Corradin
发表日期2010-11-08
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards home equity. Using US household data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation for the period 1996-2006, we find that especially households with low net worth maintain a larger share of their wealth as home equity if a larger homestead exemption applies. This home equity bias is also more pronounced if the household head is in poor health, increasing the chance of bankruptcy on account of unpaid medical bills. The bias is further stronger for households with mortgage finance, shorter house tenures, and younger household heads, which taken together reflect households that face more financial uncertainty.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Home ownership Homestead exemptions Personal bankruptcy Portfolio allocation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8097
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536957
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Harry Huizinga,Reint Gropp,Luc Laeven,et al. DP8097 Who Invests in Home Equity to Exempt Wealth from Bankruptcy?. 2010.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Harry Huizinga]的文章
[Reint Gropp]的文章
[Luc Laeven]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Harry Huizinga]的文章
[Reint Gropp]的文章
[Luc Laeven]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Harry Huizinga]的文章
[Reint Gropp]的文章
[Luc Laeven]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。