| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8127 |
| DP8127 Social Interactions and Spillovers | |
| Yves Zenou; Antoni Calvó-Armengol | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The aim of this paper is to provide a tractable model where both socialization (or network formation) and productive efforts can be analyzed simultaneously. This permits a full-fledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous productive efforts and heterogeneous agents. We show that there exist two stable interior equilibria, which we can Pareto rank. The socially efficient outcome lies between these two equilibria. When the intrinsic returns to production and socialization increase, all equilibrium actions decrease at the Pareto-superior equilibrium, while they increase at the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. In both cases, the percentage change in socialization effort is higher (in absolute value) than that of the productive effort. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Network formation Peer effects Welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8127 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536964 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yves Zenou,Antoni Calvó-Armengol. DP8127 Social Interactions and Spillovers. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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