| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8136 |
| DP8136 Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty | |
| Boyan Jovanovic; Julien Prat | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed and when the effort and noise affect output additively. We then analytically solve for the optimal contract when the agent has exponential utility. We find that the Pareto frontier shifts out as information about the agent's quality improves. In the standard spot-market setup, by contrast, when the parameter measures the agent's 'quality', the Pareto frontier shifts inwards with better information. Commitment is therefore more valuable when quality is known more precisely. Incentives then are easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the beliefs of the principal. Moreover, in contrast to results under one-period commitment, wage volatility declines as experience accumulates. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Principal-agent model Optimal contract Learning Private information Reputation Career |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8136 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536973 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Boyan Jovanovic,Julien Prat. DP8136 Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty. 2010. |
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