| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8143 |
| DP8143 Politics and Monetary Policy | |
| Michael Ehrmann; Marcel Fratzscher | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How and why do politicians? preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks? Looking at the European Central Bank, the paper shows that politicians, on average, favor significantly lower interest rates. Three factors explain the different preferences. First, politicians put relatively less weight on inflation (and more on output) in their preferred monetary policy reaction function. Second, politicians? preferences are affected by political economy motives. Third, different preferences are also, and largely, due to different constituencies, as politicians primarily focus on national economic objectives rather than the euro area as a whole. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Delegation European central bank Interest rates monetary policy Time inconsistency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8143 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536980 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ehrmann,Marcel Fratzscher. DP8143 Politics and Monetary Policy. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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