G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8184
DP8184 Communal Responsibility and the Coexistence of Money and Credit Under Anonymous Matching
Albrecht Ritschl; Lars Boerner
发表日期2011-01-10
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European merchants in the absence of modern enforcement technologies. This paper shows how this mechanism helps to overcome enforcement problems in anonymous buyer/seller transactions. In a village economy version of the Lagos and Wright (2005) model, agents trading anonymously in decentralized markets can be identified by their citizenship and thus be held liable for each other. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis easily extends itself to other payment systems like credit cards that provide a group identity to otherwise anonymous agents.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Anonymous matching Bills of exchange Communal responsibility Money and credit demand
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8184
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537021
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Albrecht Ritschl,Lars Boerner. DP8184 Communal Responsibility and the Coexistence of Money and Credit Under Anonymous Matching. 2011.
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