| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8190 |
| DP8190 Who Should Pay for Certification? | |
| Konrad O Stahl; Roland Strausz | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-01-10 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer --- the seller --- follows from a non--trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer--induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence seller--induced certification acts as a signalling device. Seller--induced certification maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be induced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets -- in particular the financial market. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Certification Information acquisition Inspection Lemons Middlemen Signaling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8190 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537027 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konrad O Stahl,Roland Strausz. DP8190 Who Should Pay for Certification?. 2011. |
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