| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8195 |
| DP8195 Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Elisabetta Iossa | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Contracts often reward inefficient tasks and are not enforced ex post. We provide a new explanation based on the relationship between explicit contracts and implicit agreements, distinguishing the ex-ante decision to sign a contract from the ex-post decision whether to apply it. We show that it is often optimal to have overcontracting - contractual clauses requiring costly, inefficient, verifiable tasks (A) - not enforced in equilibrium. Overcontracting facilitates relational contracting on efficient non-contractible tasks (B) by anticipating and strengthening punishments following defections. With adverse selection, it is optimal to choose tasks A analogous to B in terms of required skills. The model also explains why stipulated damages must be moderate in size. These results apply independently of whether B is a `productive' task or a 'bribe'. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Governance Incomplete contracts Multi-tasking Relational contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8195 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537032 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Elisabetta Iossa. DP8195 Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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