| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8197 |
| DP8197 Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending | |
| Rohini Somanathan; Jean-Marie Baland; Zaki Wahhaj | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Group loans with joint liability have been a distinguishing feature of many microfinance programs. While such lending has benefitted millions of borrowers, major lending institutions have acknowledged their limited impact among the very poor and have recently favored individual contracts. This paper attempts to understand these empirical patterns using a model in which there is a single investment project and access to credit is limited by weak repayment incentives. We show that in the absence of large social sanctions, the poorest borrowers are offered individual and not group contracts. When both types of contracts are feasible, the relative gains from group loans are shown to be decreasing in loan size. We compare the role of bank enforcement with social sanctions and find that bank enforcement is more effective in increasing outreach while social sanctions raise the welfare of infra-marginal borrowers. Finally, we explore the welfare effects of group size and find that those requiring small loans are better served by larger groups but group size effects are, in general, ambiguous. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Group lending Joint-liability Microcredit Repayment incentives Social sanctions. |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8197 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537034 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rohini Somanathan,Jean-Marie Baland,Zaki Wahhaj. DP8197 Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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