| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8216 |
| DP8216 Informational Rents, Macroeconomic Rents, and Efficient Bailouts | |
| Thomas Philippon; Philipp Schnabl | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze government interventions to alleviate debt overhang among banks. Interventions generate two types of rents. Informational rents arise from opportunistic participation based on private information while macroeconomic rents arise from free riding. Minimizing informational rents is a security design problem and we show that warrants and preferred stocks are the optimal instruments. Minimizing macroeconomic rents requires the government to condition implementation on sufficient participation. Informational rents always impose a cost, but if macroeconomic rents are large, efficient recapitalizations can be profitable. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Bailouts Crises Debt overhang Recapitalization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8216 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537053 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Philippon,Philipp Schnabl. DP8216 Informational Rents, Macroeconomic Rents, and Efficient Bailouts. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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