G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8226
DP8226 Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market
Alberto Martin
发表日期2011-02-01
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Adverse selection Collateral Credit markets Monitored lending Screening
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8226
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537063
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alberto Martin. DP8226 Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market. 2011.
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