全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP8251 Policymakers? Horizon and Trade Reforms

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP8251
	DP8251 Policymakers? Horizon and Trade Reforms
	Maurizio Zanardi; Giovanni Facchini; Paola Conconi
发表日期	2011-02-01
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	We investigate how term length and election proximity affect policymakers? willingness to support trade reforms. We exploit the institutional features of the U.S. Congress--in which House and Senate representatives serve two-year and six-year terms respectively, and one third of the Senate is up for election every two years--allowing us to compare legislators with mandates of different length, as well as three "generations" of senators, with different remaining time in office. We examine the determinants of congressmen?s voting behavior on all major trade reforms undertaken by the U.S. since the early 1970?s. We find that House members are less likely to support trade liberalization bills than Senate members. However, this result does not hold for senators in the last two years of their mandate, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by differences in term length. Focusing on Senate votes only confirms that the last generation is significantly more protectionist than the previous two, a result that holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators on the same bill, and that of individual senators on different bills. Inter-generational differences disappear for senators who have "safe seats" or have announced their retirement, indicating that the protectionist effect of election proximity is driven by legislators? fear to lose office.
主题	International Macroeconomics
关键词	Term length Election proximity Trade reforms
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp8251
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537065
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Maurizio Zanardi,Giovanni Facchini,Paola Conconi. DP8251 Policymakers? Horizon and Trade Reforms. 2011.