| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8229 |
| DP8229 Efficient and Inefficient Welfare States | |
| Pierre Cahuc; Yann Algan; Marc Sangnier | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that cross country differences in the generosity and the quality of the welfare state are associated with differences in the trustworthiness of their citizens. We show that generous, transparent and efficient welfare states in Scandinavian countries are based on the civicness of their citizens. In contrast, the generosity but low transparency of the Continental European welfare states survive thanks to the support of a large share of uncivic individuals who consider that it can be justifiable to misbehave with taxes and social benefits. We also explain why countries with an intermediate degree of trustworthiness of their citizens and of transparency of the government, like Anglo-Saxon countries, have small welfare states. Overall, this paper provides a rationale for the observed persistence of both efficient and inefficient welfare states, as a function of the civicness of the citizens. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Civism Corruption Trust Welfare state |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8229 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537067 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Cahuc,Yann Algan,Marc Sangnier. DP8229 Efficient and Inefficient Welfare States. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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