| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8241 |
| DP8241 Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Petra Nieken | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals may prefer to offer contracts with memory. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Laboratory experiment Repeated moral hazard Sequential hidden actions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8241 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537079 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Petra Nieken. DP8241 Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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