G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8255
DP8255 Tiered Housing Allocation: an Experimental Analysis
Juan Carrillo; Saurabh Singhal
发表日期2011-02-14
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要We study in the laboratory, a variant of the house allocation with existing tenants problem where agents are partitioned into tiers with different privileges. Members of higher tiers receive their allocation before those in lower tiers and can also take the endowment of a member of a lower tier if they wish to. In this tiered environment, we evaluate the performance of the modified versions of three well-known mechanisms - the Top Trading Cycle (TTC), the Gale-Shapley (GS) and the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD). For all three mechanisms, we find low rates of participation (around 40%), high rates of truth-telling conditional on participation (around 90%) and efficiency levels that are high (above 90%) but below full efficiency. Also, of the three novelties introduced in our experiment -tiered structure, multiple matches and known priority queue- only the last one has an impact on choices, with subjects being significantly more likely to participate the higher their position in the queue. Finally, the majority of subjects who do not play according to the theory still follow discernible patterns of participation and preference revelation.
主题Public Economics
关键词House allocation Laboratory experiment Matching
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8255
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537092
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Juan Carrillo,Saurabh Singhal. DP8255 Tiered Housing Allocation: an Experimental Analysis. 2011.
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