| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8262 |
| DP8262 On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining | |
| Kfir Eliaz; Geoffroy de Clippel | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the set of possible outcomes is taken as given. This paper is concerned with situations where decision-makers first need to identify the set of feasible outcomes before they bargain over which of them is selected. Our objective is to understand how different bargaining institutions affect the incentives to disclose possible solutions to the bargaining problem, where inefficiency may arise when both parties withold Pareto superior options. We take a first step in this direction by proposing a simple, stylized model that captures the idea that bargainers may strategically withhold information regarding the existence of feasible alternatives that are Pareto superior. We characterize a partial ordering of "regular" bargaining solutions (i.e., those belonging to some class of "natural" solutions) according to the likelihood of disclosure that they induce. This ordering identifies the best solution in this class, which favors the "weaker" bargainer subject to the regularity constraints. We also illustrate our result in a simple environment where the best solution coincides with Nash, and where the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is ranked above Raiffa's simple coin-toss solution. The analysis is extended to a dynamic setting in which the bargainers can choose the timing of disclosure. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Disclosure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8262 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537099 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kfir Eliaz,Geoffroy de Clippel. DP8262 On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
