| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8271 |
| DP8271 A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation | |
| Enrico Perotti; Javier Suarez | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relative merit of price versus quantity rules, showing how they target different incentives for risk creation. When banks differ in credit opportunities, a Pigovian tax on short-term funding is efficient in containing risk and preserving credit quality, while quantity-based funding ratios are distorsionary. Liquidity buffers are either fully ineffective or similar to a Pigovian tax with deadweight costs. Critically, they may be least binding when excess credit incentives are strongest. When banks differ instead mostly in gambling incentives (due to low charter value or overconfidence), excess credit and liquidity risk are best controlled with net funding ratios. Taxes on short-term funding emerge again as efficient when capital or liquidity ratios keep risk shifting incentives under control. In general, an optimal policy should involve both types of tools. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Liquidity requirements Liquidity risk Liquidity risk levies Macroprudential regulation Systemic risk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8271 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537108 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Enrico Perotti,Javier Suarez. DP8271 A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation. 2011. |
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