| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8280 |
| DP8280 Market Structure, Countervailing Power and Price Discrimination: The Case of Airports | |
| Jonathan Haskel; Tommaso Valletti | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study bargained input prices where up and downstream firms can choose alternative vertical partners. We apply our model to airport landing fees where a number of interesting policy questions have arisen. For example, what is the impact of joint ownership of airports? Does airline countervailing power stop airports raising fees? Should airports be prohibited, as an EU directive intends, from charging differential prices to airlines? Our major findings are: (a) an increase in upstream concentration or in the substitutability between airports always increases the landing fee; (b) the effect of countervailing power, via an increase in downstream concentration, typically lowers landing fees, but depends on the competition regime between airlines and whether airports can price discriminate: airline concentration reduces the landing fee when downstream competition is in quantities, but if downstream competition is in prices landing fees fall only where airports cannot discriminate. Furthermore, only in a specific case (Bertrand competition, uniform landing fees and undifferentiated goods) will lower fees pass through to consumers. (c) With Cournot competition, uniform landing fees are always higher than discriminatory fees, while the reverse is true with Bertrand competition. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Airlines Airports Countervailing power Landing fees |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8280 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537117 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan Haskel,Tommaso Valletti. DP8280 Market Structure, Countervailing Power and Price Discrimination: The Case of Airports. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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