| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8281 |
| DP8281 Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption | |
| Lars Persson; Pehr-Johan Norbäck; Roger Svensson | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-03-07 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is more likely to be sold (or licensed) to an incumbent due to strategic product market effects on the sales price. Preemptive acquisitions by incumbents are shown to stimulate the process of creative destruction by increasing the entrepreneurial effort allocated to high-quality invention projects. Using data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under bidding competition. Asymmetric information problems are shown to be solved by verification through entry for sale. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Acquisitions entrepreneurship Innovation Ownership Patent Start-ups |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8281 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537118 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars Persson,Pehr-Johan Norbäck,Roger Svensson. DP8281 Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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