G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8281
DP8281 Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption
Lars Persson; Pehr-Johan Norbäck; Roger Svensson
发表日期2011-03-07
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is more likely to be sold (or licensed) to an incumbent due to strategic product market effects on the sales price. Preemptive acquisitions by incumbents are shown to stimulate the process of creative destruction by increasing the entrepreneurial effort allocated to high-quality invention projects. Using data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under bidding competition. Asymmetric information problems are shown to be solved by verification through entry for sale.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Acquisitions entrepreneurship Innovation Ownership Patent Start-ups
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8281
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537118
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Lars Persson,Pehr-Johan Norbäck,Roger Svensson. DP8281 Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption. 2011.
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