| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8282 |
| DP8282 Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay | |
| Emmanuelle Auriol; Stephane Straub; Thomas Flochel | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-03-07 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the country?s GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Corruption Development Procurement Rent-seeking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8282 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537119 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emmanuelle Auriol,Stephane Straub,Thomas Flochel. DP8282 Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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