| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8298 |
| DP8298 Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships | |
| Maitreesh Ghatak | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-03-14 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze optimal contracts and optimal matching patterns in a simple model of partnership where there is a double-sided moral hazard problem and potential partners differ in their productivity in two tasks. It is possible for one individual to accomplish both tasks (sole production) and there are no agency costs associated with this option but partnerships are a better option if comparative advantages are significant. We show that the presence of moral hazard can reverse the optimal matching pattern relative to the first best, and that even if partnerships are optimal for an exogenously given pair of types, they may not be observed in equilibrium when matching is endogenous, suggesting that empirical studies on agency costs are likely to underestimate their extent by focusing on the intensive margin and ignoring the extensive margin. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Endogenous matching Partnerships Contractual structure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8298 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537133 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maitreesh Ghatak. DP8298 Contractual Structure and Endogenous Matching in Partnerships. 2011. |
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