| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8302 |
| DP8302 Preventing Collusion through Discretion | |
| Leonardo Felli; Rafael Hortala-Vallve | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-03-21 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Large public bureaucracies are commonly regarded as less efficient than modern private corporations. This paper explores how the degree of discretionary power might account for this difference in efficiency. Indeed, increasing the discretionary power of the intermediate layers of an organization - delegating power to them - enhances productivity by preventing collusion and capture between middle managers and line workers; provided that this detrimental form of collusion takes place in conditions of asymmetric information. To understand how this mechanism works requires an explicit model of the penalty for breach of a collusive agreement a party has to incur to walk away from such a side deal. Delegation is then a simple way for the principal to compensate the uninformed colluding party for walking out of collusion and for using/reporting the information leaked in the collusive negotiation. This threat clearly reduces the informed party incentive to participate in side deals and prevents collusion at a reduced cost. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Communication Delegation Hierarchies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8302 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537139 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leonardo Felli,Rafael Hortala-Vallve. DP8302 Preventing Collusion through Discretion. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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