| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8338 |
| DP8338 Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality | |
| Pierre Picard; Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the patent office that maximises either the social welfare or its own profit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy inappropriate objectives of patent office management. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Intellectual property Patent system Public firm organization Quality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8338 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537165 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Picard,Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. DP8338 Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
