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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP8358 |
DP8358 Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies | |
Patrick Bolton; Olivier Jeanne | |
发表日期 | 2011-04-01 |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Under financial integration banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to minimize the costs with respect to an individual country's sovereign debt default. While diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post. We show that financial integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt. The safest governments inefficiently restrict the amount of high quality debt that could be used as collateral in the financial system and the riskiest governments issue too much debt, as they do not take account of the costs of contagion. Those inefficiencies can be removed by various forms of fiscal integration, but fiscal integration typically reduce the welfare of the country that provides the "safe-haven" asset below the autarky level. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Banking Collateral European debt crisis European monetary union Financial contagion Government debt Government default International financial integration |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8358 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537185 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bolton,Olivier Jeanne. DP8358 Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies. 2011. |
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