| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8366 |
| DP8366 Investments as Signals of Outside Options | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Susanne Goldlücke | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by the seller's desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the other hand, ex post efficiency is not attained whenever the buyer mistakenly tries to call the seller's bluff with a low offer. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hold-up problem Incomplete contracts Relationship-specific investments Signaling games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8366 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537193 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Susanne Goldlücke. DP8366 Investments as Signals of Outside Options. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
