| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8323 |
| DP8323 A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts | |
| Emmanuelle Auriol; Pierre Picard | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-04-03 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-off between the government's shadow costs of financing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumers may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of ex-ante informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession cost characteristics to public firms at the termination of the concession. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Infrastructure Natural monopoly Privatization Public-private-partnership Regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8323 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537205 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emmanuelle Auriol,Pierre Picard. DP8323 A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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