G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8324
DP8324 Liquidity shocks, roll-over risk and debt maturity
Javier Suarez; Anatoli Segura
发表日期2011-04-03
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要We develop an infinite horizon model of an economy in which banks finance long term assets by placing non-tradable debt among savers. Banks choose the overall principal, interest rate, and maturity of their debt taking into account two opposite forces: (i) investors' preference for short maturities (which stems from their exposure to preference shocks) and (ii) banks' exposure to systemic liquidity crises (during which debt refinancing becomes specially expensive). Importantly, the terms of access to refinancing during crises depend endogenously on banks' aggregate refinancing needs. Due to pecuniary externalities, the unregulated equilibrium exhibits inefficiently short debt maturities. We analyze the possibility of restoring efficiency or improving welfare by means of limits to debt maturity, Pigovian taxes, and liquidity insurance schemes.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Liquidity premium Liquidity risk regulation Maturity structure Pecuniary externalities Systemic crises
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8324
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537206
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Javier Suarez,Anatoli Segura. DP8324 Liquidity shocks, roll-over risk and debt maturity. 2011.
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