| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8405 |
| DP8405 Optimal Contracts with Enforcement Risk | |
| Nicola Gennaioli | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-05-20 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I build a model where potentially biased judges verify complex states by interpreting an imperfect signal whose noise captures factual ambiguities. In a sales and a financial transaction I show that judicial biases amplify and distort factual ambiguities, creating enforcement risk. To insure against such risk, parties write simple non-contingent contracts that optimally protect the party that is most vulnerable to judicial error. These results shed light on the empirical association between law and finance and rationalize salient features of real world enforcement regimes. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Imperfect judicial enforcement Optimal contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8405 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537226 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicola Gennaioli. DP8405 Optimal Contracts with Enforcement Risk. 2011. |
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