| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8392 |
| DP8392 Venture Capital, Patenting, and Usefulness of Innovations | |
| Lars Persson; Pehr-Johan Norbäck; Steffen Lippert; Simona Fabrizi | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-05-31 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze incentives to develop entrepreneurial ideas for venture capitalists (VCs) and incumbent firms. If VCs are sufficiently better at judging an idea's value and if it is sufficiently more costly to patent low than high value ideas, VCs acquire valuable ideas, develop them beyond the level incumbents would have chosen, and use patents to signal their companies' high value to acquirers prior to exiting. This increases the VC-backed companies' patenting intensity and long-run performance, but also infl ates their acquisition prices, and lowers their acquirers' overall profits. Patent law usefulness clauses would reduce such excessive, signaling-driven investment and patenting intensity. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Venture capital Innovation Signaling Preemptive vs late acquisition strategies Patenting intensity Patent law Usefulness requirement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8392 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537240 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars Persson,Pehr-Johan Norbäck,Steffen Lippert,et al. DP8392 Venture Capital, Patenting, and Usefulness of Innovations. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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