| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8454 |
| DP8454 Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility | |
| Péter Kondor; Veronica Guerrieri | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a model of delegated portfolio management with career concerns. Investors hire fund managers to invest their capital either in risky bonds or in riskless assets. Some managers have superior information on the default risk. Looking at the past performance, investors update beliefs on their managers and make firing decisions. This leads to career concerns which a¤ect investment decisions, generating a counter-cyclical 'reputational premium.' When default risk is high, the bond?s return is high to compensate uninformed managers for the high risk of being fired. As default risk changes over time, the reputational premium amplifies price volatility. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Amplification Career concerns Delegated portfolio management |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8454 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537282 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Péter Kondor,Veronica Guerrieri. DP8454 Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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