| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8461 |
| DP8461 Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment | |
| jan boone; Gijsbert Zwart | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, we find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences among consumers. Consequently, the outcome is not efficient even if cost differences are fully compensated. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate for serving high-risk agents to take into account the difference in mark-ups among the two types. Second, the difference in switching behavior creates a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies to high and low types increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low-risk market to the less elastic high-risk market. Finally, mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus even further, at the cost of efficiency. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Health insurance Imperfect competition Leverage Risk adjustment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8461 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537289 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone,Gijsbert Zwart. DP8461 Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment. 2011. |
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