| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8462 |
| DP8462 Growth, Selection and Appropriate Contracts | |
| Alessandra Bonfiglioli; Gino Gancia | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Appropriate contracts Appropriate institutions Development Growth Information Selection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8462 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537290 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Bonfiglioli,Gino Gancia. DP8462 Growth, Selection and Appropriate Contracts. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
