G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8476
DP8476 Asset Commonality, Debt Maturity and Systemic Risk
Franklin Allen; Elena Carletti; Ana Babus
发表日期2011-07-01
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要We develop a model in which asset commonality and short-term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk. Banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk. Two asset structures arise. In a clustered structure, groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together. In an unclustered structure, defaults are more dispersed. Portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency. When bank debt is short-term, creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are inefficiently liquidated. This information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures. In contrast, when bank debt is long-term, welfare is the same under both asset structures.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Interim information Rollover risk. Short-term debt
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8476
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537313
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Franklin Allen,Elena Carletti,Ana Babus. DP8476 Asset Commonality, Debt Maturity and Systemic Risk. 2011.
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