| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8478 |
| DP8478 Standardized Enforcement: Access to Justice vs Contractual Innovation | |
| Enrico Perotti; Nicola Gennaioli | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shape the joint development of markets and the law. In a setting where more resourceful parties can distort contract enforcement, we find that the introduction of standard contracts reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting two effects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it hampers commercial and legal innovation by crowding out the use of innovative contracts. We offer a rationale for the large scale commercial codification that occurred in Common Law systems in the XIX century during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Imperfect judicial enforcement Optimal contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8478 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537315 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Enrico Perotti,Nicola Gennaioli. DP8478 Standardized Enforcement: Access to Justice vs Contractual Innovation. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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