G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8501
DP8501 Health Insurance without Single Crossing: why healthy people have high coverage
jan boone; Christoph Schottmüller
发表日期2011-08-01
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要Standard insurance models predict that people with high (health) risks have high insurance coverage. It is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured. We show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in the standard insurance model. If insurers have some market power, this can explain the empirically observed outcome. This observation has also policy implications: While risk adjustment is traditionally viewed as an intervention which increases efficiency and raises the utility of low health agents, we show that with a violation of single crossing a trade off between efficiency and solidarity emerges.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Health insurance Risk adjustment Single crossing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8501
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537338
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
jan boone,Christoph Schottmüller. DP8501 Health Insurance without Single Crossing: why healthy people have high coverage. 2011.
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