| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8501 |
| DP8501 Health Insurance without Single Crossing: why healthy people have high coverage | |
| jan boone; Christoph Schottmüller | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Standard insurance models predict that people with high (health) risks have high insurance coverage. It is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured. We show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in the standard insurance model. If insurers have some market power, this can explain the empirically observed outcome. This observation has also policy implications: While risk adjustment is traditionally viewed as an intervention which increases efficiency and raises the utility of low health agents, we show that with a violation of single crossing a trade off between efficiency and solidarity emerges. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Health insurance Risk adjustment Single crossing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8501 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537338 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone,Christoph Schottmüller. DP8501 Health Insurance without Single Crossing: why healthy people have high coverage. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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