| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8529 |
| DP8529 Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching | |
| Venkataraman Bhaskar; Ed Hopkins | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the incentives of parents to invest in their children when these investments improve their marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria that plagues models with deterministic returns, and ensure that a unique equilibrium often exists. Equilibrium investment is efficient when there is complete symmetry between the sexes. However, when there is any asymmetry between the sexes, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investments are generically excessively relative to Pareto-efficiency. Our model can be used for examine several implications of gender differences. For example, if shocks are more variable for boys than for girls, girls will invest more than boys. If there is an excess of boys, then there is parental over-investment in boys and under-investment in girls, and total investment will be excessive. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Assortative matching tournament Ex ante investments Gender differences Marriage Sex ratio. |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8529 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537363 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Venkataraman Bhaskar,Ed Hopkins. DP8529 Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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